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SHOULD HISTORY LOCK IN LOCK-IN?
Larry E. Ribstein*

ABSTRACT

The corporation does not allow owners, at least by default, to cash out their
interests.
This feature of "capital lock-in" facilitates durable and centralized
management of corporate assets. It has been argued that capital lock-in is what has made
the corporation the dominant business form and has enabled the modem firm.
This argument for the historical significance of capital lock-in is intended to provide a
rationale for rejecting reforms that would compromise lock-in. However, lock-in has
costs including inhibiting effective monitoring of managers. Moreover, the historical
argument is inaccurate because lock-in has always been available in the partnership
form. Lock-in should be viewed as just one of many features of firms that evolve to
meet business needs-not frozen in place by a dubious account of the past.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a series of articles about the history of the corporation, Margaret Blair argues
that the Industrial Revolution created a need for a reliable and sustainable business entity
1
form that would protect the various investments of the participants in the firm.
The corporation crucially filled, and still fills, that need. The story is enlivened by
historical anecdotes of how particular firms had to solve the continuity problem in order
to become successful.
In Blair's account, the business forms that preceded the corporation, mainly the
sole proprietorship and partnership, did not work because they were destabilized by
owners' ability to withdraw their shares. The sole proprietorship is vulnerable to
everything that might happen to the proprietor, including death and inheritance.
The partnership form was inadequate because a partner could dissolve the firm at will.
A variant on the partnership, the joint stock company, also was not a complete solution
because of its default aggregate features. Only the corporate form prevented the cash-out
* Mildred van Voorhees Jones Chair, University of Illinois College of Law.
1. See e.g. Margaret M. Blair, The Neglected Benefits of the Corporate Form: Entity Status and the
Separation of Asset Ownership from Control, in Corporate Governance and Firm Organization:
Microfoundations and Structural Forms 45 (Anna Grandori ed., Oxford U. Press 2004) [hereinafter Blair,
Neglected]; Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us, I Berkeley
Bus. L.J. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Blair, History]; Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What CorporateLaw
Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 387 (2003) [hereinafter Blair,
Locking in Capital].
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of owners' interests, thereby facilitating the creation of large-scale business enterprises.
This story has an important policy implication. The fact that recognition of a
durable corporate entity enabled the Industrial Revolution indicates that the corporate
feature of capital lock-in was necessary to the growth of modem business and continues
to be an essential feature of the corporation.
While this makes an interesting story, it is questionable law, history, and
economics. First, Blair has not precisely identified the economic problem for which
capital lock-in supposedly is a solution. This is important because capital lock-in may
have significant costs in some contexts that must be balanced against any economic
benefits. The cost-benefit tradeoff depends on the circumstances of particular firms and
may vary over time.
Second, Blair assumes that capital lock-in was not available in the partnership,
thereby necessitating use of the corporation. However, partners have always been able to
contract to prevent liquidation through the partnership agreement, as well as to deter
partner exit by contracting for buyout rights. This undermines Blair's theory that the
corporate form was necessary for capital lock-in. Moreover, the joint stock company, a
variant on partnership, offered any continuity that the standard-form partnership lacked.
Third, even if the corporation offered stronger default entity features than
partnership, this still does not demonstrate the need for the corporate form. Partnership
law was already developing continuity and other entity features by the early nineteenth
century, the period Blair discusses. The fact that partnerships now can have all of the
entity aspects of corporations indicates that these features never were inherently
inconsistent with partnership. The partnership form clearly could have developed entity
features had the corporation never been invented.
This does not mean that the development of the corporate form was anomalous or
unnecessary. There is some value to offering different sets of features in distinct
standard forms because the development of the alternative corporate form theoretically
economized on contracting by firms. 2 Blair is wrong, not in concluding that corporate
features were important, but in suggesting that the creation of the modem corporateform
was necessary for the development of modem business. In fact, like other aspects of
business association standard forms, 3 these features are only contingently important in
responding to the business needs that exist for any particular form.
Blair's use of capital lock-in to explain the corporation matters for two reasons.
First, even if the same basic features have always been available in partnerships and
corporations, there is an important distinction between the two forms: in this country,
creation of a corporation historically required state intervention and, therefore, could be
considered a sort of concession of state power. 4 Thus, any argument that the corporate
form was necessary to enable the modem firm implicitly supports the significant role of
the state that necessarily accompanies the corporate form. Conversely, relying more on

2. See Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Formsfor Closely Held Firms: Theories andEvidencefrom LLCs, 73
Wash. U. L.Q. 369 (1995).
3. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Important Role of Non-OrganizationLaw, 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 751

(2005).

4. See infra n. 88 and accompanying text.
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the contractual partnership form might diminish the state's role in regulating business
associations.
Second, characterizing capital lock-in as the corporation's central feature suggests
that it should be preserved against any tinkering by courts or legislatures. Blair's history,
therefore, would shore up the normative justification found in Blair's work with her
co-author Lynn Stout. They argue for the role of the board as "mediating hierarchs" who
act on behalf of all groups that contribute resources to the firm rather than just the
shareholders. 5 Empowering investors to cash out of the firm would weaken managers'
ability to control corporate assets for the benefit of non-shareholder constituencies.
It arguably follows that all corporate constituencies would want to mandate capital
lock-in as a way to effectuate the strong role of managers Blair and Stout envision.
The problem with this justification of capital lock-in is that it is not clear that
shareholders will always want capital lock-in even though lock-ins encourage
contributions by other constituencies. The power to withdraw capital may be a necessary
way to control agency costs by managers or opportunism by majority shareholders.
Moreover, relationships between other constituencies and the corporation may be
adequately covered by contracts rather than by firm-type fiat, particularly as markets
develop. Accordingly, capital lock-in may not be essential to attract investments by
these constituencies. In short, the costs of lock-in may sometimes exceed the benefits.
Reducing the case for corporate lock-in to historical inevitability bypasses these details.
Part II of this article identifies the economic problem that justifies the capital
lock-in solution. Unlike in Blair's explanation, the problem does not directly concern the
These
multifarious contributions made by the parties to corporate contracts.
contributions may give rise to shirking because of the difficulty of measuring each
party's contribution to the entity's surplus. Shirking might be addressed by monitoring,
Lock-in addresses the separate problem of
including by the firm's managers.
opportunism, which may arise because of a contributor's ability to, in effect, appropriate
more than its share of the firm's surplus by withdrawing a resource that helps produce
that surplus. Whether that is a problem depends on several factors, including the nature
of the contribution and the effect of withdrawal on the enterprise. Moreover, lock-in
may have costs, including inhibiting monitoring of managers by preventing dissatisfied
owners from removing their investments.
Part III shows that lock-in, even if efficient, has always been available in the
partnership form. Not only has partnership law permitted contracting around liquidation
at will, but it has also allowed the partners to contract around any obligation to return to
the partners the full value of their investments in the firm. Moreover, the joint stock
company variant on partnership provides any continuity the standard form partnership
lacks. To be sure, the partners might be able to hold up the firm by withdrawing their
human capital, but neither partnership nor corporate law has ever been able to fully
prevent this. This simple legal fact casts significant doubt on Blair's capital lock-in
account of the rise of the corporation.

5. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of CorporateLaw, 85
Va. L. Rev. 247 (1999).
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Part IV discusses the policy implications of Blair's historical account and,
therefore, the significance of its flaws. If the corporate form is not essential to modem
business, neither are the corporation's specific attributes, particularly its regulatory
nature. The partnership approach to lock-in would have better enabled firms to balance
the costs and benefits of lock-in in particular situations and to choose alternatives to
strong-form corporate-type lock-in as they became more viable. Corporate lock-in is not
essential to the theory of the firm, but rather to Blair and Stout's particular normative
vision of corporate managers as mediating hierarchs. History cannot save Blair the effort
of normatively defending this view.
Part V offers concluding remarks.
II.

CAPITAL LOCK-IN AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM

This Part discusses the economic role of capital lock-in. Subpart A reviews the
role of lock-in in the economic theory of the firm, focusing on the distinct problems of
shirking and opportunism. Subpart B casts doubt on whether the benefits of lock-in were
ever as clear as Blair suggests. Subpart C discusses the significant potential costs of
lock-in in impeding monitoring.
A.

The Theory: Lock-in, Shirking, and Opportunism

Blair attributes the need for capital lock-in to what she and Stout refer to as the
"team production" problem--that is, "the problem of assembling and coordinating the
use of complex inputs for long-term or continuous production." 6 But Blair has identified
not one, but two, quite distinct problems-shirking and opportunism. She also ignores
an important problem that lock-in creates-the "agency cost" problem.
The shirking problem arises when production in the typical large firm requires
various inputs from several sources whose outputs cannot easily be identified with
specific members of the corporate "team." The difficulty of determining whether
suppliers are providing optimal performance complicates contracting in the firm.
Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz theorize that participants in a firm have an incentive
to "shirk," hoping that their colleagues will pick up the slack and that no one will notice
who is doing what.7 For example, a group of furniture movers might earn more money
by doing more moves than each could individually, but because the profit cannot be
8
isolated to specific movers, each has an incentive to free ride on the others' efforts.
Blair cites Alchian and Demsetz as a source of the team production concept in her work
10
alone 9 and with Stout.
A solution to this version of the team production problem is to hire a monitor who
can observe the behavior of the team members and mete out appropriate rewards and

6. Blair, History,supra n. 1, at 6.
7. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, andEconomic Organization,
62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 779-81 (1972).
8. As this example suggests, the shirking problem does not depend on the existence of distinct types
of inputs.
9. See Blair, Locking in Capital,supran. 1,at 399 n. 31.
10. See Blair & Stout, supra n. 5, at 265.
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1
punishments to encourage optimal behavior, including through ex ante contracts. 1
However, this creates the agency cost problem inherent in delegating power to a
non-owner manager.
In the second, or opportunism, version of the team production problem, the
inseparability of inputs permits individual members to appropriate part of the surplus
12
created by the other team members by threatening to withdraw their resources.
For example, if a daily newspaper depends on a printer to give timely service to its
readers and advertisers, the printer might "hold up" the newspaper for more money by
threatening to suspend operations and thereby delay publication. 13 The problem in this
situation is one of enforcement rather than of monitoring. The parties may have been
able to agree on how much of the joint product should be allocated to each contributor in
order to maximize the joint surplus, but they have no easy way to hold their partners to
this deal when one or more of the parties can pull his resources out.
The parties might reduce opportunism by locking their resources into a jointly
owned firm. Once the parties have traded their resources for ownership interests in the

firm, they cannot easily appropriate the joint surplus by withdrawing their resources if
the parties own and directly control only their ownership interests and not the resources
themselves. They might sell these interests to third parties or leave them to their heirs,
but this would leave the firm and its resources intact. Lock-in may, however, exacerbate
the costs of delegating control to non-owner agents because the parties' ability to take
14
their investments out of the firm is an important way to discipline the firm's managers.
Thus, while lock-in addresses the opportunism problem, it complicates the solution to the
shirking problem.
The analysis so far has relied on the economic theory of the firm rather than the
legal concept of the business association. Blair reasons that the Chandlerian firm created
a need for a legal entity form that was "reliable and sustainable." 15 Stability and
continuity would reassure resource contributors that their investments would be
protected from opportunistic withdrawal by investors. Most importantly, under Blair's
theory, this corporate-type continuity would enable managers to develop and implement
the broad and long-term strategies necessary to the creation of the modem firm.
Blair bases her analysis on anecdotes about the growth of early large enterprises in
the nineteenth-century U.S. For example, Blair discusses Lehigh Coal and Navigation
Company, in which several individuals combined to form companies to produce and

11. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra n. 7, at 781-83.
12. Blair, Locking in Capital,supra n. 1,at 404-05; Blair & Stout, supra n. 5, at 272-76. For various
versions of the problem Blair and Stout discuss, see Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of
Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (Free Press 1985); Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and
Hierarchies:Analysis and Antitrust Implications (Free Press 1975); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford &
Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process,
21 J.L. & Econ. 297 (1978); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J.
Econ. 387 (1998); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & Econ. 233 (1979).
13. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra n. 12, at 300.
14. See infra n. 29 and accompanying text.
15. Blair, Locking in Capital,supra n. 1, at 412.
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transport coal. 16 Neither branch of the business was viable without the other, thereby
raising a potential opportunism problem. Under Blair's theory, the partnership form
could not bind the parties into a sustainable unit that would resist an individual party's
ability to withdraw resources from the entity. Part III, below, critically analyzes Blair's
claims about the relative continuity of the corporate and partnership forms.
According to Blair, having locked the assets into the strong corporate entity,
functional control could be given to a board of directors, thereby separating control from
the ownership of the resources. 17 The board would mediate among the various resource
contributors. Blair states that "when decisionmaking authority is allocated to a board of
directors, individual team members relinquish some of the ability they might otherwise
have had to hold up other members." 18 In other words, the mediating hierarchy solves
the opportunism problem. But she does not address lock-in's effect on agency costs;
therefore, she is inconclusive on whether the benefits of capital lock-in outweigh
the costs.
B.

The UncertainBenefits of CapitalLock-in

Blair's account of the need for capital lock-in is based on a few examples rather
than the sort of comprehensive review of nineteenth-century business that would justify
Blair's explanation of the rise of the corporate form. This is evident from studying the
work of the progenitor of the theory of the firm, Ronald Coase.
Douglas Baird, in a paper based on Coase's notebooks, 19 discusses Coase's
analysis of the reasons for the integration into single firms of General Motors and Fisher
Body, on the one hand, and Ford Motor and Keim Mills, on the other. Based on
interviews with key personnel, Coase observed that GM and Fisher Body were primarily
concerned with closely coordinating their assembly operations. Fisher Body shipped
sheets of stamped metal to specially built GM assembly plants and then coordinated
welding the sheets into car bodies with Chevrolet's production team. This combined
operation was the sort of work usually done in a single factory. Similarly, Ford and
Keim Mills were concerned with keeping intact the production team that initially worked
for Keim Mills and helped design the Model T.
The interdependence of the body and assembly operations in GM, and among the
production team members in Ford, enabled one party to appropriate part of the entity's
surplus by threatening to pull out. For example, GM could hardly have continued
making cars without Fisher Body. This suggests that these firms, like those Blair
discusses, needed the capital lock-in feature of the strong corporate entity.
Baird, however, shows that formal legal integration was in both cases merely an
afterthought to physical integration of processes rather than something the parties
2
evidently considered vital to the transaction. 0

16. Id.at 399-404.
17. Id.at 433-34.
18. Id.at 434.
19. Douglas G. Baird, In Coase's Footsteps (John M. Olin L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 175, 2d ser.,
Jan. 2003) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=368400).
20. Id.
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Indeed, in the case of Ford, it is not clear how legal integration or organizational
form could have helped the parties, whatever the sequence of events. Employment
contracts might mitigate the problem, but these contracts also do not depend on
organizational form. Similarly, in Blair's own Lehigh example, 2 1 the supposed
opportunism problem of the need to keep the engineer associated with the team also
involves a human capital issue that cannot be resolved by organizational form.
22
These observations are also supported by a study of early American partnerships,
that notes partners' ability to act opportunistically by withdrawing and appropriating
firm-specific assets. 2 3 The study shows how partners minimized the hold-up problem by
allying with their equals in age, productivity, and capital, so that the partners could
credibly commit to refrain from opportunistic conduct. Again, organizational form and
capital lock-in were irrelevant.
These questions about the role of business form in solving opportunism problems
have an important implication. To the extent that integration depends on such factors as
physical logistics, it would not have the sort of fundamental importance to the modem
firm that Blair attributes to it. As Baird points out, echoing Coase, integration of
24
operations depends on the relative costs of doing business within firms and in markets.
As markets develop, firms become less important. 25 For example, firms like Dell
contract with multiple suppliers for components that once would have been made in the
manufacturing plants owned by the branded firm. 26 This suggests that Blair's story may
have little relevance to today's firms even if she was right concerning why the corporate
form initially arose.
C.

Monitoringand the Costs ofLock-in

Even if capital lock-in has significant value for many large firms, there is an
additional question whether the benefits of lock-in exceed the costs. Capital liquidity
enables owners to discipline or minimize the costs imposed by shirking,
misappropriating managers, or controlling owners. This point is particularly relevant in
light of the fact that many of the corporations Blair discusses were closely held, or at
least did not have developed markets for their shares. For perspective, consider that the
New York Stock Exchange did not even have a building until 1865 and in 1830 traded as
little as thirty-one shares a day. 27 Thus, even if firms derived significant benefits from
continuity, lock-in might also have imposed significant costs on owners who could not
28
trade their shares.
21. See supra nn. 16-18 and accompanying text.
22. Howard Bodenhom, Partnership and Hold-Up in Early America (Natl. Bureau of Econ. Research

Working Paper No. W8814, Mar. 2002) (available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract
_id=302575).

23. Id.
24. See Baird,supra n. 19, at 13-14.

25. Id. at 14.
26. See Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?I Berkeley Bus. L.J. 183, 206-08 (2004).
27. See N.Y. Stock Exch., Chronology of New York Stock Exchange (1792-1929),

http://

www.nysedata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/vieweredition.asp?mode=table&key-2169&category=4
(accessed
Mar. 18, 2006).
28. Blair, in fact, sees the ability to trade as the antidote to lock-in. See infra n. 30 and accompanying text.
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The value of capital liquidity should be assessed in light of other potential
monitoring and incentive mechanisms. 29 Owner voting rights may involve a significant
free-rider problem because each owner would incur costs of being informed and
coordinating with other owners while sharing the governance benefits with all other
owners. Owners may be able to transfer voting and economic rights to other owners, but
changing the identity of the owner does not necessarily put pressure on the managers.
The purchaser may acquire enough shares to overcome the free-rider problem and to
make meaningful changes, but this tactic may be costly and risky, particularly because
incumbent managers with broad agency powers usually can impede control transfers.
Finally, courts can supervise fiduciary breaches, but this judicial power must be limited
by the business judgment rule because of the costs of courts' meddling in business
decisions and of placing the burden of business risks on agents.
The standard mechanisms of controlling agents, therefore, all have significant
gaps. Empowering owners to cash out of or dissolve the firm can effectively
complement or replace these devices. This power permits each owner to express a
judgment about the opportunity costs of an investment in the firm. If that judgment is
negative, the managers lose control over some of the firm's cash. Because each owner
benefits by being able to redeploy his capital, this device does not involve a free-rider
problem comparable to that of shareholder voting. And the device does not invite a court
to second-guess managerial decisions. Rather, exiting shareholders implicitly decide
how the collective output of all of the managers' decisions compares with alternative
uses of their money.
It is important to emphasize that the ability to cash out of the firm differs from the
power corporate shareholders have to sell their interests to third parties. This power to
sell only enables shareholders to obtain the value of their interests in the firm less any
discount the market applies because of current management. Moreover, the sale does not
remove capital from managers' control but simply shifts it to other powerless owners.
Although the power to trade shares reduces the costs of lock-in, Blair is wrong when she
30
indicates that shareholders are not locked in merely because they can sell their shares.
In short, the benefits of lock-in may not outweigh the costs for many firms.
This casts doubt on Blair's conclusion that capital lock-in was pervasively important for
firms generally, either in the nineteenth century or today.
III.

LoCK-IN AND THE CORPORATE FORM

Even if capital lock-in was important for large nineteenth-century firms, Blair's
theory raises the additional question of whether the corporate form was necessary to
achieve this objective. Blair argues that partnership law during the relevant period
provided by default that each partner had the power to dissolve a partnership or seek a
buyout by the firm31 and partnerships were dissolved by a partner's death, subjecting the

29. See Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 N.D. L.
Rev. 1431 (2006).
30. Blair, History, supra n. 1, at 29-30 (stating that the "provisions of corporate law.., do not lock in
particular investors, since individual investors can sell their shares to other investors").
31. See Blair, Locking in Capital,supra n. 1, at 409-13.
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firm to the uncertainty of litigation over the estate. 32 Corporations, by contrast, could be
dissolved only by action of the board of directors followed by a vote of a majority of the
owners. Thus, according to Blair, the corporate form was necessary
to ensure that the
33
business.
the
up
break
not
would
estate
shareholder's
controlling
The problem with this explanation is that partners have always been able to
contract for significant continuity. 34 Partners at one time could prevent dissolution
without cause just by agreeing to a definite term.3 5 Even where the partnership entity
was dissolved upon partner dissociation, partners could agree to continue the partnership
business.36 Although partners, like other agents, had an absolute power to terminate
their association with the firm, they did not have an absolute power either to compel
termination of the firm or to receive the value of their interests during the period Blair
discusses. The courts for centuries have enforced contracts providing for continuation of
the firm after partner retirement or death and payment of amounts provided for in the
partnership agreement. 37 Under such an agreement, a member could dissociate himself
from further obligations to the firm but would not necessarily be able to take any cash
with him. Although a partner might opportunistically use the power to exit, such as
when the member had skills that were important to the firm, neither the corporate nor the
partnership form bound a partner's human capital to the firm. Deterring opportunism
was left to contract, including non-competition agreements and agreements regarding
payoff of exiting members.
Partners actually effectively provided for continuity, including in some of the
situations that Blair relies on to illustrate the instability of the partnership form.
For example, although Blair offers Baldwin Locomotive as an example of how corporate
continuity would have benefited the partners, the partnership agreement in that case
provided for continuity through slow payoff of the estate. 3 8 Andrew Carnegie's "iron
clad" continuity provisions provided that partners could buy out a deceased or retired
partner's share of the business at book value, payable by installments. 39 Blair notes that
this arrangement worked so well that a locked-in partner caused trouble, illustrating
the
40
trade-off between continuity and the need to give members a suitable exit route.

32. Id.at420-21.
33. Id. at 446.
34. See Arthur J. Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty and Associations in the
Common Law, 29 Buff. L. Rev. 599, 648-51 (1980) (discussing various aspects of partnership law's
recognition of the ongoing character of business).
35. See Alan R. Bromberg & Larry E. Ribstein, Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership § 7.03(a) n. 4
(Aspen Publishers 2006); Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Law of Partnership§§ 273-76, 425-33 (7th ed.,
Little, Brown & Co. 1881).
36. See Bromberg & Ribstein, supra n. 35, at § 7.1 1(e).
37. Niel Gow, PracticalTreatise on the Law of Partnership341-42, 435 (2d ed., Thomas Davison 1825)
(discussing agreements for continuation after partner death or retirement); Story, supra n. 35, at §§ 199, 320321 (discussing clauses for continuation notwithstanding partner death in order to be sure that the business is
"steadily carried on"); id. at §§ 207, 331 (discussing clause providing for purchase of other partner "at a
valuation" if "express stipulation" (footnote omitted)); Percy F. Wheeler, Partnership and Companies:
A Manual of PracticalLaw 87 (Adam & Charles Black 1892) (discussing enforcement of buyout agreements
under English partnership law).
38. Blair, Locking in Capital,supra n. 1, at 453-54.
39. Id. at 451-52.
40. Id. at 452.
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Blair makes much of the need for corporate-type continuity to protect firms from
claims of partners' heirs. 4 1 However, partnership law gives partners' heirs no interest in
partnership property. 42 Although the partnership dissolves by default on a partner's
death, as with other partner dissociation, the partners can agree to continue the firm and
pay off the estate. The heirs might fight over equity shares in a partnership, as in a
corporation, 4 3 but they cannot threaten either the firm's capital or the surviving partners'
control over the assets. Edward Warren's leading early treatise on choice of form
confirms that, despite default dissolution of the partnership
entity on dissociation of a
44
liquidation.
avoid
contractually
can
partners
member,
Blair argues that the corporate form reinforces capital lock-in through other entity
45
features, including those restricting owners from transferring specific firm property.
However, the partnership form had many entity characteristics by the time of the
Industrial Revolution. Although there is authority that partners at one time could transfer
specific partnership property without co-partner consent, 4 6 any such right always
conflicted with partners' power to co-manage the firm and the ancient partnership
principle of delectus personae, or choice of associates. At least by the nineteenth
century, these principles had been accommodated in much the same way that they are in
modem partnerships-and not much differently from modem corporations, by holding
that a partner could not unilaterally transfer control over partnership property. Thus, the
1850 Appeal of Horton47 held that a partner's attempted transfer of all of his right in
partnership assets did not give the purchaser any right over any of the firm's assets.
Instead, the transfer caused a dissociation of the selling partner and, therefore,
dissolution of the firm, after which the remaining partner possessed the assets for the
purpose of winding up the business and paying off the debts.
By the nineteenth century, partnership law in the U.S. and Britain had similarly
recognized, consistent with modem partnership and corporate law, that individual
partners could not bind partnership assets on individual debts. 48 Thus, in 1810, Pierce v.
Jackson49 held:
At common law, a partnership stock belongs to the partnership, and one partner has no
interest in it, but his share of what is remaining after all the partnership debts are paid, he
also accounting for what he may owe to the firm. Consequently, all the debts due from the
joint fund must first be discharged, before any partner can appropriate any part of it to his
own use, or pay any of his private debts; and a creditor to one of the partners cannot claim
any interest, but what belongs to his debtor, whether his claim be founded on any contract

41. Id. at 446.
42. See Rev. Unif. Partn. Act § 501, 6 U.L.A. 1 (2001) [hereinatler RUPA]; Unif. Partn. Act § 25(2)(d),
6 U.L.A. 275 (2001) [hereinafter UPA].
43. See Mark Maremont, Court Documents Present Insight into Breakup of PritzkerEmpire, Wall St. J. A3
(Jan. 11, 2006) (discussing squabbling over estate among various factions of the Pritzker family).
44. See Edward H. Warren, CorporateAdvantages without Incorporation33 (Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1929).
45. See Blair, Locking in Capital,supra n. 1,at 423-25.
46. See Martin v. Crump, 91 Eng. Rep. 385 (1698).
47. 13 Pa. 67 (1850).
48. See Fox v. Hanbury,98 Eng. Rep. 1179 (1776); Bromberg & Ribstein, supra n. 35, at § 3.04.
49. 6 Mass. 242 (1810).
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made with his debtor, or on a seizing of the goods on execution. There are several cases,
50
by which these principles, so reasonable and equitable, are recognized and confirmed.
Pierce, accordingly, held an attachment of partnership property by a creditor of one of
the partners was not valid against a later attachment by a partnership creditor.
Blair also cites creditor-protection features such as the owners' commitment to
maintain a capital investment in the firm through statutory legal capital provisions and
the "trust fund" doctrine. 5 1 But these rules deal with a problem different from the
opportunism that capital lock-in addresses--agency costs and moral hazard between
corporate shareholders and creditors. Limited liability shareholders with little invested
in the firm have an incentive to commit the firm to risky actions because the shareholders
get much of the benefit of success while creditors bear the brunt of failure.
While owners' perverse incentives may be reduced to some extent by requiring
shareholders to commit substantial personal assets to the firm, such a requirement may
significantly reduce firms' flexibility and may only minimally protect creditors over
fraudulent conveyance statutes. 52 In any event, because shareholders alone can decide
where to incorporate, creditors have little power to impose rules that shareholders do not
want. Accordingly, minimum capital requirements and other creditor protection rules
have long played only a vestigial role in corporate law. 53 Any such rules that still exist
are an aspect of limited liability rather than specifically of the corporate form.
Thus, many limited liability partnership-type statutes have creditor protection provisions
similar to those in corporate statutes. 54 In short, these rules cannot help explain the
dominance of the corporate form.
Even if a traditional standard-form partnership could be deemed to lack some
corporate-like continuity or entity features, this is clearly not the case for joint stock
companies and business trusts, forms that existed throughout the period Blair discusses.
Warren demonstrates through a lengthy analysis that the joint stock company, which he
refers to as a "species of partnership" to which partnership rules were generally
applicable except as modified by agreement, 55 had all of the six "corporate" features
Warren identifies except limited liability. 56 Moreover, during this period the parties had
available the "Massachusetts Business Trust," still widely used today for mutual funds,
which had all of the features of a joint stock company plus limited liability and a greater
57
potential for concentrating management power.
Most importantly for present purposes, Warren emphasizes that a joint stock
company did not have the partnership disadvantage of impermanence. 58 Warren
discusses a case that demonstrated that the parties could agree to full continuation of the

50. Id. at 243 (citations omitted).
51. See Blair, Neglected, supra n. 1, at 56-57.
52. See Larry E. Ribstein, An Applied Theory ofLimited Partnership,37 Emory L.J. 835 (1988).
53. See Bayless Manning & James J. Hanks, Jr., Legal Capital(3d ed., Found. Press 1990).
54. See Unif. L.L.C. Act §§ 406-407, 6A U.L.A. 553 (2003); Unif. LP Act § 607, 6A U.L.A. 1 (2003).
55. See Warren, supra n. 44, at 327-28.
56. Id. at 327-52.
57. Id. at 328; see also id. at 352 (referring to the business trust as a "superior means" of obtaining
corporate advantages as compared to the joint stock company).
58. Id. at 334.
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firm on partner death, 59 noting the court's reasoning that parties sought to "imitate a
The joint stock company also solves Blair's other criticisms of the
corporation.
partnership form. Because of its combination with the trust device, property can be
placed in a separate entity and, therefore, is not subject to the partnership's aggregate
ownership features. Management power can be concentrated in trustees, who have
powers comparable to those of corporate directors. 6 1 Even Blair notes that joint stock
between 1760 and 1810 in the U.S. and
companies "became increasingly sophisticated"
62
laws.
corporate
earliest
the
for
were a model
Given the availability of the joint stock company, what is left of Blair's argument
that the corporate form was necessary to enable capital lock-in? She notes that joint
stock companies were subject to partnership law except to the extent that they adopted
corporate features. 6 3 But "linkage" with existing forms may involve benefits as well as
costs because of the valuable legal predictability that comes with the application of
65
64
Even if there was English authority denying entity treatment,
existing precedents.
and even assuming that the Bubble Act denied67transferability in England,6 6 there is no
evidence that these problems crossed the ocean.
Finally, Blair supports her theory by attempting to refute the argument that it was
limited liability rather than continuity that accounted for the rise of the corporation. This
matters for Blair because she is less concerned with the corporation than with the lock-in
feature of corporate law. As evidence that limited liability was not an important reason
for incorporation, Blair quotes a joint stock company's stated rationale for incorporating,
noting that it emphasized continuity rather than limited liability. 68 However, Blair also
notes that these requests for incorporation were "controversial," 69 so it is understandable
that this public document would underplay a potentially unpopular reason for
incorporation.
On the other side, Warren argues:
[L]imitation or elimination of liability of the shareholders is not merely the chief single
advantage of a business corporation but it is the advantage which in the estimation of
legislatures and also in the estimation of the public is of more importance than all the other
advantages put together. It is the main thing./
This makes sense in light of the above analysis. In contrast to lock-in and other
corporate features, limited liability was the only feature that firms could not fully

59. Warren, supra n. 44, at 334-35 (discussing Phillips v. Blatchford, 137 Mass. 510 (1884)).
60. Id. at 336 (citing Phillips, 137 Mass. at 515).
61. Id. at338-40.
62. See Blair, Locking in Capital,supra n. 1, at 419.
63. ld.at419-20,422.
64. See Larry E. Ribstein, Linking Statutory Forms, 58 L. & Contemporary Problems 187 (1995).
65. See Blair, Locking in Capital,supra n. 1, at 422.
66. It is not clear that the act denied transferability. See Warren, supra n. 44, at 330-31 (discussing
minimal enforcement of the Bubble Act and questions concerning whether it made transferable shares illegal).
67. See id. at 333 (noting that the Bubble Act was not commonly regarded as a feature of U.S. law,
so transferable shares were clearly legal here).
68. See Blair, Locking in Capital,supra n. 1, at 420-21.
69. Id.at 420.
70. See Warren, supra n. 44, at 399.
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duplicate by contract alone without statutory assistance. 7 1 To be sure, limited liability
alone might not have been particularly important to firms before enterprise liability and
the demise of contractual privity rules at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the
twentieth century. But it could account for the rise and persistence of the corporate form
when combined with the corporation's default continuity feature.
Blair, along with other commentators, 72 may have missed the availability of
continuity through the partnership form by paying insufficient attention to the nuances of
how business law can develop. To begin with, commentators often assume that law
evolves in discrete statutory leaps, ignoring the development that occurs through
contracts between statutory changes. This is analogous to assuming that all of evolution
is in the fossil record. These authors have focused on the fact that continuity provisions
were not adopted in formal U.S. statutes until the Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA") in
1914, and then further extended in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA") in
1994. But, the drafters of the original UPA sought only to clarify, and not radically alter,
partnership law. That was the reason, bolstered by detailed case law support, drafter
William Draper Lewis gave for adopting the "tenancy in partnership" in UPA.73
More recently, these features were well-recognized in Georgia prior to its adoption of
74
UPA in 1985.
Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, and Richard Squire carry this
under-appreciation of the entity features of partnership law beyond UPA and into the
adoption of RUPA in the late twentieth century. 75 They claim that RUPA increased
partnership's continuity by, for example, barring a wrongfully dissociating partner from
being bought out until completion of an agreed term or undertaking unless he could show
that immediate buyout would not cause "undue hardship to the business." 76 This would
support their theory that stronger continuity had to await development of better valuation
technology. But RUPA's changes cut both for and against continuity. For example,
RUPA merely substituted a deferred payout of the wrongful partner 7 7 for the

71. See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 Md. L. Rev. 80 (1991)
(discussing importance of ability to contract to entity choice).
72. E.g. Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 Harv.
L. Rev. 1333 (2006) (arguing that partnerships did not attain corporate-type continuity until the advent of
RUPA in the late twentieth century, by which time the development of valuation mechanisms facilitated buyout
as an alternative to liquidation); Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Corporate Governance and
the Plight of Minority Shareholdersin the United States before the Great Depression (Natl. Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. W10900, Nov. 2004) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=618582) (arguing that investors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century chose to
incorporate because of the dissolvability of partnership, leading the courts to clarify the non-dissolvability of
the corporation and thereby to facilitate majority oppression of minority shareholders); see also e.g. Ron
Harris, The Formation of the East India Company as a Deal between Entrepreneurs and Outside Investors,
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=567941 (n.d.) (discussing dissolvability of the partnership
as a reason for the development of the specialized business form of the East India Company in the early
seventeenth century).
73. See William Draper Lewis, The Uniform PartnershipAct-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism,29 Harv.
L. Rev. 158, 172 (1915).
74. See Larry E. Ribstein, An Analysis of Georgia's New PartnershipLaw, 36 Mercer L. Rev. 443 (1985)
(showing the relationship of the charging order to Georgia's pre-UPA law).
75. See Hansmann, Krakkman & Squire, supran. 72, at 1391.
76. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. See RUPA § 701(h).
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infrequently used UPA duty to post a bond to avoid immediate payment of an exiting
partner's interest. 78 RUPA actually reduced continuity by eliminating the non-payment
of goodwill that had discouraged departure under UPA. 79 Also, RUPA, but not UPA,
requires payment of goodwill to wrongfully dissolving partners, a move that actually
reduces the firm's continuity by requiring the members to come up with more cash for
wrongfully departing members.
Blair and other commentators also make questionable assumptions about the
importance of legal default rules. What corporate shareholders got by default, partners
were able to get by agreement, including agreements restricting buyout of dissociating
partners. The costs of making such agreements may have mattered for smaller firms
whose costs of contracting around defaults are high per dollar of capitalization. But it is
not clear why these costs would impede adoption by the larger firms that are the focus of
Blair's analysis.
Even if there is a persistent difference between the corporate and partnership forms
regarding lock-in, the difference could be attributed to limited liability and not any
inherent inability of the partnership form to accommodate lock-in. Indeed, Lewis
indicated that he would have accepted the decision of his predecessor, UPA-drafter
James Barr Ames, to apply forthright entity characterization were it not for what he
believed was the inconsistency between entity treatment and personal liability of the
the argument that limited liability, and not lock-in, is the main
members. 8 1 This bolsters
82
corporate characteristic.
Thus, even in the nineteenth century, there was no inherent inconsistency between
the partnership and corporate forms regarding continuity. Whether or not the differences
between the standard forms are significant, there was at least no impediment to
developing corporate-type continuity through a partnership-type form rather than turning
to the corporation. Even if there is value to having distinct standard forms to serve
distinct types of firms, 83 these distinct forms could be offshoots of partnership, such as
the joint stock company. The long history of the close corporation indicates that the
corporate form was not specific to the large publicly held firm of Blair's focus.
like the corporation are not clearly lower than
The costs of moving to a brand new form
84
evolving variations on the partnership.

78. See UPA § 38(2)(b).
79. UPA § 38(2)(b); RUPA § 701.
80. Id.
81. See Lewis, supra n. 73, at 165-66.
82. Lewis's concern was based on the highly conceptual distinction between "aggregates" and "entities"
rather than on practical considerations. Id. The RUPA drafters opted for entity characterization seventy years
later, as did several cases even under UPA, even with the owners' personal liability. Even with personal
liability, entity features arguably predominate over aggregate in the partnership. See Bromberg & Ribstein,
supra n. 35, at § 1.03 (discussing cases concerning the aggregate-entity distinction). To be sure, personally
liable members need to be able to sever their membership in the firm and, therefore, their liability for future
debts. But they can do this without being given a right to pull their investments out of the firm.
83. See supra n. 2 and accompanying text.
84. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities,43 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 79 (2001) (discussing tradeoffs between these strategies).
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Finally, Blair appears to concede all this when she states in a footnote that she does
85
not want to debate whether lock-in might have developed outside the corporate form.
This suggests that Blair is concerned only about the lock-in feature and not with
particular business forms. But this concession is inconsistent with Blair's emphasis on
the special role of the corporate form. 86 The importance of that claim is discussed in
the next Part.
IV.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE HISTORICAL ACCOUNT

Blair's account of corporate history is questionable economics and history. Strong
continuity has costs as well as benefits. And even if lock-in is as important as Blair
asserts to the history of business, the partnership, as well as the corporation, could have
provided it. The explanation for the mix of forms we observe today lies in a much richer
87
set of business, regulatory, and tax considerations than Blair's simplistic lock-in story.
But why should Blair's story and, therefore, the problems with the story matter?
Plainly lock-in is an important feature of modem business. Even if lock-in might have
developed in the partnership form, it would still have been important in that form.
What difference does it make whether lock-in was responsible for the development and
persistence of the corporation?
First, Blair's story provides a defense of the corporate form. This is important
because the contractually-based partnership is not well suited to Blair's purpose.
If lock-in is essential to maintaining the mediating hierarchy, it should not be subject to
contractual variation. The corporation brings with it the concession theory-the theory
that corporate power is derived from the state. 88 This supports a presumption favoring
legal restrictions on contracts, 89 including contracts that could erode lock-in.
Second, Blair is concerned with defending lock-in against modem assaults and not
simply with the development of the corporation. If lock-in is just another feature of the
firm that evolved to meet business needs, it could just as easily fade into history. On the
90
other hand, if lock-in is the essential core of the corporate form, as Blair suggests,
it obviously cannot be dealt with so lightly. This weightiness of lock-in matters to
Blair's theory of the corporation because the power of her mediating hierarchy depends
on this rigid foundation.
Blair argues that an important implication of the central role of lock-in is that we
should not tinker with the corporation in a way that threatens this feature, as by
significantly weakening managers' ability to defend against takeovers. 9 1 Blair supports
this approach with a contractual argument: Given the contrast between the corporation

85. See Blair, Locking in Capital,supran. 1, at 422 n. 128.
86. See Blair, History, supra n. 1.
87. See Ribstein, supra n. 3.
88. See Larry E. Ribstein, The ConstitutionalConceptionof the Corporation,4 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 95 (1995).
89. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the
Anti-Contractarians,65 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1990).
90. See Blair, History, supra n. 1.
91. Id. at 32-42.
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and the partnership regarding lock-in, the parties to the corporation necessarily have
indicated a preference for lock-in by incorporating. 92 Thus, Blair states:
If equity investors in corporations had wanted the same rights of control over
corporate assets as partners in a partnership have over partnership assets, then
have invested in partnership-type organizations rather than in
they shouldS 93
corporations.
Even if Blair were right about the significance of lock-in in the corporate form, she
would be wrong about the implications. To be sure, investors' ability to choose among
partnership and corporate forms may be valuable for investors because it enables them to
94
escape the form of capital lock-in that currently exists in the corporate form.
Moreover, the ability to escape through choice of form arguably supports the existence
of alternative rules. However, contrary to Blair's argument, the availability of choice of
form does not support any particular menu of choices. More importantly, the fact that
parties can choose among different forms does not mean that particular rules in a given
form should be mandatory.
If lock-in does not account for the rise of the corporation, what does? In other
words, if lock-in could just as easily have been accommodated within the partnership
form, why did corporations become so important? Limited liability is, at least, part of
the answer. 9 5 Capital lock-in also played a role but not, as Blair supposes, because it is
inherent in and essential to the corporation. Rather, lock-in was backed by politically
influential corporate managers because of its role in underpinning managers' power.
Empowering owners to cash out of the firm would have the significant effect of
loosening managers' control over the corporate cash. Thus, lock-in matters not as a
business necessity but as a regulatory objective. Corporate managers have reason to like
the control over corporate cash that lock-in enables. They would, accordingly, favor
laws that maintain this control, including laws associated with the corporate form.
For example, the corporate tax has the effect of reducing owners' incentives to insist on a
96
right to distributions.
Although Blair purports to embrace choice of form, 97 her theory implies that firms
should be compelled to accept capital lock-in. If lock-in is as important as Blair
suggests, it follows that courts and regulators should suspect contracts and business
associations that purport to reject it. Legal pressures toward lock-in will become more
significant as the business and political stories diverge. Business considerations

92. Id. at 19-26.
93. Id. at 38.
94. See Ribstein, supra n. 29; Ribstein, supra n. 26. Blair oddly disputes this argument on the basis that
"passive investors in limited partnerships may have even less ability to withdraw their contribution or influence
management to make distributions than shareholders have, especially if the limited partnership shares are
publicly traded." Blair, History, supra n. 1, at 38 n. 142. This seems to suggest that limited partners are more
like corporate shareholders than actual corporate shareholders are, thereby undercutting Blair's claim that
lock-in is an essential difference between the forms.
95. See Ribstein, supra n. 88 (showing how the corporate entity provided the conceptual basis for
limited liability).
96. See Steven A. Bank, A CapitalLock-in Theory of the CorporateIncome Tax, 94 Geo. L. J. 889 (2006);
Ribstein, supra n. 29.
97. See supra n. 92 and accompanying text.
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increasingly favor a different sort of firm--one that relies on contracts and markets
rather than ownership of far-flung assets. 98 As Douglas Baird has observed: "No longer
are the entities providing the goods or services long-lived, atomistic firms with a readily
identifiable governance structure." 99 Thus, rules that favor the traditional corporate
entity can be expected to get increasingly out of step with business reality.
V.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Blair theorizes that capital lock-in is both the essential nature of the corporation
and the reason why corporations dominate the business landscape today. This confers
stature on capital lock-in that it does not deserve, given the varying costs and benefits of
lock-in depending on the particular context and firm. Moreover, lock-in has never been
unique to the corporate form and did not make the rise of the corporation inevitable.
Thus, the lock-in feature should not be frozen in place by this dubious historical account.
Rather, the business forms should be free to evolve to meet changing business needs.

98. See Ribstein, supra n. 26.
99. See Baird, supra n. 19, at 14.
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